

# **RSA**

**CS/ECE 407**

# Today's objectives


Describe another public-key crypto system: RSA

Understand the prime factoring problem


Construct RSA-based encryption and signatures



**Alice**  
sk



**Bob**  
pk



**Eve**

## **Public Key Encryption**

Anyone with pk can encrypt

Only one with sk can decrypt


## **Signatures**

Only one with sk can sign


Anyone with pk can verify



**Alice**  
sk



**Bob**  
pk



**Eve**

## **Public Key Encryption**

Anyone with pk can encrypt

Only one with sk can decrypt

*ElGamal Encryption*

## **Signatures**

Only one with sk can sign

Anyone with pk can verify

*Schnorr Signatures*

# Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Let  $\text{Gen}$  be an algorithm that defines a family of cyclic groups and their generators

We say the DDH problem is hard for that family if the following ensembles are indistinguishable:

$$\left\{ (\mathbb{G}, g, g^x, g^y, g^z) \mid \begin{array}{l} (\mathbb{G}, g) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\lambda) \\ x \leftarrow \{0, \dots, |\mathbb{G}| - 1\} \\ y \leftarrow \{0, \dots, |\mathbb{G}| - 1\} \\ z \leftarrow \{0, \dots, |\mathbb{G}| - 1\} \end{array} \right\} \approx \left\{ (\mathbb{G}, g, g^x, g^y, g^{xy}) \mid \begin{array}{l} (\mathbb{G}, g) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\lambda) \\ x \leftarrow \{0, \dots, |\mathbb{G}| - 1\} \\ y \leftarrow \{0, \dots, |\mathbb{G}| - 1\} \end{array} \right\}$$

# RSA

Rivest, Shamir, Adleman

One of the oldest, most widely  
used public key systems

Based on the hardness of  
**factoring numbers**

# RSA

Rivest, Shamir, Adleman

One of the oldest, most widely  
used public key systems

Based on the hardness of  
**factoring numbers**

Given product of two large primes  $N = pq$   
we believe it is hard to find  $p, q$

Let  $p, q$  be primes

Let  $N = p \cdot q$

$x^{-1} \bmod N$  exists if and only if  $\gcd(x, N) = 1$

Number of elements in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$

$$(p-1)(q-1) = N - p - q + 1$$

Let  $p, q$  be primes

Let  $N = p \cdot q$

$x^{-1} \bmod N$  exists if and only if  $\gcd(x, N) = 1$

Number of elements in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^\times$

$$\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1) = N - p - q + 1$$

$$x^{\phi(N)} = 1 \bmod N$$

# RSA Assumption

$$\text{GenRSA}(1^\lambda) = \left\{ (N, e, d) \left| \begin{array}{l} p, q \leftarrow \lambda\text{-bit primes} \\ N = p \cdot q \\ \text{choose } e > 1 \text{ s.t. } \gcd(e, \Phi(N)) = 1 \\ d = e^{-1} \bmod \Phi(N) \end{array} \right. \right\}$$

We say the RSA problem is hard if for all polytime  $A$  the following is probability is negligible:

$$\Pr \left[ x^e = y \bmod N \left| \begin{array}{l} (N, e, d) \leftarrow \text{GenRSA}(1^\lambda) \\ y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^\times \\ x \leftarrow A(N, e, y) \end{array} \right. \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

# Key-Encapsulation Mechanism

*An encryption scheme that works for random keys*

$\text{KeyGen}() \rightarrow (\text{pk}, \text{sk})$

$\text{Encapsulate}(\text{pk}) \rightarrow (\text{c}, \text{k})$

$\text{Decapsulate}(\text{sk}, \text{c}) \rightarrow \text{k}$

*contrast with...*

$\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, \text{m}) \rightarrow \text{c}$

# RSA KEM

KeyGen( $1^\lambda$ ):

$(N, e, d) \leftarrow \text{GenRSA}(1^\lambda)$

$\text{pk} = (N, e)$

$\text{sk} = (N, d)$

**return**  $(\text{pk}, \text{sk})$

$H : Z_N^\times \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$   
is a random oracle

Encapsulate( $\text{pk} = (N, e)$ ):

$r \leftarrow Z_N^\times$

$c = r^e \bmod N$

$k = H(r)$

**return**  $(k, c)$

Decapsulate( $\text{sk} = (N, d), c$ ):

$r = c^d \bmod N$

$k = H(r)$

**return**  $k$

# Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack (EUF-CMA)

```
(pk, sk) ← KeyGen()  
  
key(): return pk  
  
get(m):  
    return sign(sk, m)  
  
check(m, σ):  
    return verify(pk, m, σ)
```

$\approx$

```
(pk, sk) ← KeyGen()  
S ← empty-set  
  
key(): return pk  
  
get(m):  
    σ ← sign(sk, m)  
    S ← S ∪ {(m, σ)}  
    return σ  
  
check(m, σ):  
    return (m, σ) ∈ S
```

# RSA Signatures

KeyGen( $1^\lambda$ ):

$(N, e, d) \leftarrow \text{GenRSA}(1^\lambda)$

$\text{pk} = (N, e)$

$\text{sk} = (N, d)$

**return**  $(\text{pk}, \text{sk})$

$H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow Z_N^*$   
is a random oracle

Sign( $\text{sk} = (N, d), m$ ):

$\sigma = H(m)^d \bmod N$

**return**  $\sigma$

Verify( $\text{pk} = (N, e), \sigma, m$ ):

**return**  $\sigma^e = H(m) \bmod N$

# Today's objectives

Describe another public-key crypto system: RSA

Understand the prime factoring problem

Construct RSA-based encryption and signatures